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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
From failing to arrest and surrender Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir1 in accordance with 
its obligations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court2 (Rome Statute), 
to its President acting inconsistently with its Supreme law3, it is evident that the rule of law 
is under threat in South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa has witnessed the cultivation of a 
culture of impunity for corruption in high office. South Africa has also experienced an 
increase in heinous crimes committed against women and children. The South African Rand 
recently plummeted given that its Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan, recently faced 
charges of fraud4, as well as the ripple effect caused by the Fees Must Fall Movement.5 
Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned issues that plague South Africa and hinder its 
development, the fight against money laundering hardly seems of pivotal importance in 
achieving the desired stability and development of the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant against Omar Al-Bashir. See The 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre [2016] 
ZASCA 17. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July (1998) 37 ILM 999. 
3 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and others: Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11. 
4 ENCA ‘Rand still weaker on worries over Gordhan and rating agencies’, available at 
https://www.enca.com/money/rand-still-weaker-on-worries-over-gordhan-and-rating-agencies 
(Accessed on 20 October 2016). See also Powell C ‘How the charges against Pravin Gordhan 
demonstrate a misuse of SA law’ Mail&Guardian available at mg.co.za/article/2016-10-19-how-the-  
charges-against-pravin-gordhan-demonstrate-a-misuse-of-sa-law (Accessed on 20 October 2016). 
5 Wikipedia ‘Fees Must Fall’, available at https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/FeesMustFall (Accessed on 20 
October 2016). 
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In his speech to the joint plenary of MONEYVAL6 and the FATF, Secretary General of the 
Council of the European Union, Terry Davis ,stated as follows: 
 
‘[N]o country can ever say that it is free from money laundering or that opportunities for 
terrorist financing have been eradicated. We are shooting at a moving target with new 
methods, techniques, and vehicles for money laundering... being identified every day. That 
is why we need to remain vigilant... I would like to remind everyone about what is at stake. 
Financial crime may appear to be discreet and non-violent, but appearances are often 
deceptive. Money laundering ... [is] a direct threat to the values which ... [we] defend - 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.’7 
 
 
There is a public perception that money laundering is a crime of little consequence.8 This 
perception derives from the fact that money laundering does not have a direct impact on its 
victims and in some instances benefits the economy as it increases the profits for the 
financial sector and results in a greater availability of credit.9 Laundered money arguably is 
not harmful but rather beneficial to developing economies because money remains money, 
whether it is proceeds of crime or honestly earned.10 Although an increase in money is 
appealing to developing countries, the benefits that accompany laundered money are short- 
lived as the crime affects society adversely in the long run.11 However, where a country fails 
to prevent and prosecute money laundering offences, the prevalence of money laundering 
will impede the development of a state as it not only increases the profitability of crime and 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of 
Terrorism. 
7 Davis T Secretary General of the Council of the European Union Speech at the MONEYVAL and FATF 
plenary 2007, available at  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Activities/Speech/Terry%20Davis%20speech%2010t   
h.pdf (Accessed on 19 April 2016). 
8 Unger B & Van der Linde D (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering (2013) at 20. 
9 Ferwerda J ‘The Effects of Money Laundering’ in Unger B & Van der Linde D (eds) Research Handbook 
on Money Laundering (2013) at 35. 
10 Ping H Money Laundering: Suppression and Prevention – The Research on the Legislation Concerning 
Money Laundering (2008) at 9. 
11 Ping (2008: 9). 
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encourages the prevalence of corruption, but it also causes damage to critical financial 
sector institutions.12 
Money laundering influences the commission of crimes that generate large amounts of 
profit, namely, organised crime, which is often described as the twin brother of money 
laundering.13 This is because criminals do not commit crimes to make money only but to 
enjoy this money as well.14 However, criminals need to launder their money in order to 
 
enjoy the proceeds of their criminal activities without drawing attention to these activities.15 
Countries that combat money laundering effectively make it more difficult for criminals to 
launder the proceeds of their crimes. It becomes more risky for them to indulge in their ill- 
gotten gains, thus dissuading them from engaging in economic criminality.16 
Money laundering is a process where the proceeds of crime are concealed and disguised in 
order to make them appear lawful.17 Criminals are thus able to enjoy the financial benefits 
of the crimes they commit.18 The pervasiveness of money laundering in a country does not 
only affect the confidence the public have in the country’s financial institutions but also 
undermines the confidence foreign investors and financial institutions have in a developing 
state’s financial institutions.19 A country can, therefore, run the risk of not benefitting from 
 
 
 
 
12 Moshi H.P.D ‘Fighting Money Laundering: The Challenge in Africa’ (2007) Paper 152 Institute for 
Security Studies at 2. 
13 Ping (2008:10). 
14 Asmal K (President of FATF 2005-2006) ‘Foreword’ in Muller WH, Kӓlin CH & Goldsworth JG (eds) Anti- 
Money Laundering: International Law and Practice (2007) at xix. 
15 Asmal K (President of FATF 2005-2006) ‘Foreword’ in Muller WH, Kӓlin CH & Goldsworth JG (eds) Anti- 
Money Laundering: International Law and Practice (2007) at xix. 
16 Ping (2008: 9). 
17 International Monetary Fund ‘The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism’, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm (Accessed on 12 April 
2016). 
18 Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 
Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
19 Moshi (2007: 2-3). 
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foreign direct investment.20 The financial institutions rely heavily on what the public think 
about their integrity.21 Money laundering damages the integrity of financial institutions and 
consequently hinders their ability to conduct business.22 Thus, it is important that states 
combat money-laundering activities in their respective countries in order to retain the 
confidence of foreign investors and thus stimulate continuous economic growth. Basic 
human rights, although promoted and protected by various laws, are of little use to the 
poor in a nation with a crumbling economy. Hence, it is important that South Africa address 
all the shortcomings in its anti-money laundering framework in order to ensure that it 
combats money laundering effectively, thereby eradicating the threat to its economic 
stability.23 
Furthermore, money laundering leads to inequality in the distribution of wealth, an effect 
 
that will eventually have a negative impact on the economy and ultimately lead to the 
economic instability of a state.24 It is for these latter reasons that combating and 
prosecuting the crime of money laundering is important. It is here that the anti-money 
laundering laws play an imperative role in the war against money laundering. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body established by the 
leaders of the Group of Seven Nations in Paris in 1989, is the only international body whose 
 
 
 
20 Moshi (2007: 2-3). 
21 Moshi (2007: 2-3). 
22 Anderson M ‘International Money Laundering: The Need for ICC Investigative and Adjudicative 
Jurisdiction’ (2013) 53 Virginia Journal of International Law at 767. 
23 The FATF 40 Recommendations have since been amended by the adoption of new Recommendations 
in 2012, available at 
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FA       TFRecomendations.pdf 
(Accessed on 12 April 2016). 
24 Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 
Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
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core mission is to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.25 To achieve its 
aims, the FATF compiled a list of 40+9 Recommendations (FATF /-Recommendations) which 
sets the international anti-money laundering standards that states are called upon to 
implement in their respective jurisdictions. The Recommendations focus on improving the 
anti-money laundering legal regimes of states and on ways of enhancing international co- 
operation in the fight against money laundering.26 
Although the Recommendations are soft law,27 they are enforced by way of conducting 
mutual evaluations through the FATF, which then publishes the evaluations in reports.28 
Another way in which the FATF enforces its Recommendations is by way of naming and 
shaming countries that refuse to do their part in fighting money laundering in their 
respective jurisdictions or that have lax anti-money laundering laws.29 These countries are 
placed on the ‘FATF Blacklist’30 and are classified as the Non Co-operative Countries and 
Territories. Such negative publicity has adverse consequences for the listed countries.31 
Countries, therefore, should have a solid interest in joining the fight against money 
laundering in order to avoid sanctions that would otherwise follow.32 
 
 
 
 
25 Unger B ‘Introduction’ in Unger B & Van der Linde D (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering 
(2013) at 1 - 3. 
26 Alexander K ‘The International Anti-Money Laundering Regime: The Role of the Financial Task Force’ 
(2001) 4 Journal of Money Laundering Control at 239. 
27 Soft laws are laws that are not legally binding but rather guidelines, codes of conduct or policy 
declarations that sets standards. See US Legal ‘Soft Law Legal Definition’, available at 
https://www.definitions.uslegal.com/s/soft-law (Accessed on 29 August 2016). 
28 Unger B ‘Introduction’ in Unger B & Van der Linde D (eds) Research Handbook on Money Laundering 
(2013) at 1 - 4. 
29 Damais A ‘The Financial Action Task Force’ in Muller WH, Kӓlin CH & Goldsworth JG (eds) Anti-Money 
Laundering: International Law and Practice (2007) at 78-79. 
30 A list that is publicised. 
31 Sharman JC ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States’ 
(2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly at 653. 
32 Damais A ‘The Financial Action Task Force’ in Muller WH, Kӓlin CH & Goldsworth JG (eds) Anti-Money 
Laundering: International Law and Practice (2007) at 78-79. 
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South Africa underwent its first mutual evaluation when it became a member of the FATF in 
2003 and the second mutual evaluation was conducted in 2008.33 The two evaluations were 
conducted against the benchmarks set by the 2003 Recommendations and with the use of 
the corresponding assessment methodology.34 South Africa is scheduled for its next 
evaluation in October or November 2019 and this time the country will be assessed against 
the revised 2012 Recommendations.35 As a member of the FATF, South Africa is required to 
comply with the FATF Recommendations by criminalising money laundering and adopting 
proactive measures to prevent and prosecute the crime.36 
After it assessed South Africa’s anti-money laundering and combating of terrorism laws in 
2008, the FATF, together with the FATF-style regional body, the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), stated that South Africa has a strong legislative 
and institutional anti-money framework.37 However, the FATF identified certain 
shortcomings in South Africa’s legislative response to money laundering activities that will 
be addressed in Chapter Three.38 In answering the research questions, I will focus on South 
Africa’s anti-money laundering regime and not what the country is doing to combat the 
financing of terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 The findings of the 2008 evaluation were adopted and published as the Mutual Evaluation Report of 
South Africa 2009. See also Tuba D ‘Prosecuting Money Laundering the FATF Way: An Analysis of Gaps 
and Challenges in South African Legislation from a Comparative Perspective’ (2012) 2 Acta 
Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology at 107. 
34 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 7. 
35 Financial Action Task Force ‘Assessment Calendar’, available at http://www.fatf-  
gafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&r=%2Bf%2Ffatf_country_en%2Fsouth+africa%s= 
asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table=1 (Accessed on 29 August 2016). 
36 Tuba (2012: 103). 
37 This assessment was adopted and published as the 2009 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report. 
38 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 8. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
 
This research paper seeks to answer the following two questions: 
 
• What are the shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation? 
 
• How can South Africa remedy the shortcomings in its anti-money laundering laws? 
 
1.3 Literature Survey 
 
Louis de Koker provides a brief overview of the anti-money laundering laws that existed in 
South Africa in 200339 and discusses the core provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act.40 De Koker wrote an article also on the low-risk financial products in South Africa and 
the money laundering risks that accompany them.41 In her doctoral thesis, Izelde van 
Jaarsveld focused on the amendments of the provisions of South African anti-money 
laundering laws that enable the banking institutions in South Africa to manage certain 
consequences of money laundering control while simultaneously contributing towards the 
fight against money laundering activities.42 
Moreover, David Tuba provides an analysis of the gaps identified by the FATF and challenges 
 
prosecutors face when prosecuting money-laundering activities.43 This Tuba does by 
comparing South Africa with similar systems in the United States of America and Canada. 
Although Tuba addresses some of the gaps in South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime 
as identified by the FATF, he focuses mainly on the shortcomings in relation to the 
prosecution of money laundering in South Africa. Dr Abraham Hamman and Professor 
 
 
39 De Koker L ‘Money Laundering Control: the South African Model’ (2003) 6 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control. 
40 Act 38 of 2001. 
41 De Koker L ‘The Money Laundering Risk Posed by Low-Risk Financial Products in South Africa’ (2009) 
12 Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
42 Van Jaarsveld I L Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law (LLD thesis: University of South 
Africa) 2011. 
43 Tuba D ‘Prosecuting Money Laundering the FATF Way: An Analysis of Gaps and Challenges in South 
Africa Legislation from a Comparative Perspective’ (2012) 2 Acta Criminologica: Southern African 
Journal of Criminology. 
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Raymond Koen wrote an article specifically focusing on the role attorneys play in the 
laundering of ill-gotten proceeds.44 The latter article highlights the fact that South Africa’s 
anti-money laundering legislation is silent regarding the risk of the abuse of attorneys’ trust 
accounts. However, the article does not address the shortcomings of the anti-money 
laundering regime of South Africa.45 Charles Goredema provides an overview of the 
challenges and achievements of South Africa’s fight against money laundering but he, too, 
does not address any of its deficiencies as identified by the FATF.46 Nicci Whitear-Nel wrote 
an article pertaining to the constitutionality of Section 2(2) of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act47 (POCA), a section which proved to be constitutional.48 
It is evident that there is not a substantial amount of literature that addresses the 
shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering laws. There are some articles that 
address a few of the shortcomings but none that adopt a more holistic approach to 
analysing the shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation, something 
this paper will attempt. Moreover, this paper will consider the more recent shortcomings in 
South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime as identified by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).49 Based on the reasons provided above, it is hoped that this paper will 
contribute towards raising awareness about the inadequacies that hamper South Africa’s 
ability to combat and prosecute money laundering more effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Hamman & Koen& Koen AJ & Koen RA ‘Cave Pecuniam: Lawyers as Launderers’ (2012) 15 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal. 
45 Hamman & Koen& Koen (2012: 72). 
46 Goredema C (ed), Banda J & Goba R Confronting the Proceeds of Crime in Southern Africa: An 
Introspection (2007). 
47 Act 121 of 1998 that came into effect on 21 January 1999. 
48 Whitear-Nel N ‘Law of Evidence: Recent Cases’ (2015) 1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice at 
101. 
49 See Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South 
Africa’ 2015 International Monetary Fund. See also the 2009 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report. 
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1.4 Scope of the Study 
 
This study will be limited to South Africa’s anti-money laundering legal regime. This paper 
will analyse the shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislative framework 
against the backdrop of the 2009 FATF mutual evaluation report and the International 
Monetary Fund Financial Sector Assessment Programme 2015. Reference will be made to 
the 2003 and 2012 FATF Recommendations. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
This will be a desktop study in which both primary and secondary sources will be consulted. 
The primary sources will comprise national anti-money laundering laws, FATF 
Recommendations, Mutual Evaluation Reports, case law and treaties. The secondary 
sources will comprise books, journal articles, media reports and electronic sources. 
The approach will be to see how far South Africa has come in improving its anti-money 
laundering deficiencies that were identified by both the 2009 FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Report and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programme 2015. Moreover, it will attempt to 
show why it is necessary to remedy these deficiencies in order to comply with the FATF 
Recommendations on money laundering. 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
 
This paper consists of four chapters in total. This chapter introduces the background 
information to the study. It discusses the problem that this paper aims to address and the 
theoretical basis for this study. This chapter also provides the method of research that will 
be used. 
The second chapter will define money laundering and the history behind money laundering. 
It will also deal with the international response to money laundering, as well as South 
Africa’s response to money laundering. 
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The third chapter will focus on all the shortcomings of South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
laws and their implications. 
The fourth, concluding chapter will make recommendations on how South Africa can 
improve on its anti-money laundering shortcomings. 
 
 
 
 
11  
CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING MONEY LAUNDERING 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Some academics hold the opinion that studying and understanding money laundering is a 
difficult task due to its elusive nature.50 Levi and Reuter question whether money laundering 
is an element of certain crimes or whether it is an independent activity.51 They contend that 
there is no connection between the legal construct of money laundering, which consists in 
acts as simple as placing illicit funds in one’s own bank account, and the analytical construct 
of money laundering, which includes any activity that cleans the dirty money and allows the 
perpetrator to spend the dirty money as if it has been acquired legitimately.52 
Levi and Reuter argue that it is important to know the balance between money laundering 
as an independent activity and money laundering that constitutes only an element of a 
crime.53 This proves important in determining the effectiveness of the anti-money 
laundering regime because where the evidence is used to prove the commission of money 
laundering, this evidence can also be used to prove the commission of the predicate 
offence, which then reduces the benefit of treating money laundering as an independent 
activity and not as an element of a crime.54 According to international law, money 
laundering is a crime in its own right, but is usually prosecuted as an ancillary crime due to 
its subsidiary nature in that the money laundering process can commence only upon the 
 
 
 
 
50 Levi M & Reuter P ‘Money Laundering’ (2006) 34 Crime and Justice at 291. 
51 Levi (2006: 291). 
52 Levi (2006: 291-292). 
53 Levi (2006: 291). 
54 Levi (2006: 292). 
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commission of a predicate offence.55 The prosecution of money laundering requires the 
existence of a predicate offence but perpetrators may be convicted of money laundering 
irrespective of whether they are convicted of the predicate offence.56 Thus, the money 
laundering offence is both dependent on and independent of the predicate offence.57 For 
this reason, money laundering is accepted as a specific offence but some academics argue 
that Article 6(2)(e) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime58 confirms that money laundering is not a specific offence.59 
Nevertheless, John Madinger opines that it is important that one understands the nature of 
money, knowing what money is and how it works, as this will essentially cultivate an 
understanding of money laundering.60 The concept of money was birthed thousands of 
years ago, a concept whereby an object is given a value and consequently used in trade.61 
 
Before the introduction of money, people traded one item in exchange for another item, 
which is known as the barter system.62 The barter system of exchange was the primary 
system of exchange used by early civilisations, but later it was replaced by the cash 
transaction system.63 With the evolution of the primary exchange system came the ever- 
 
 
55 Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 
Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
56 Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 
Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
57 Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 
Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
58 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in Palermo, Italy 
in 2000 and came into force on 29 September 2003. 
59 Art 6(2)(e) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime states that ‘If 
required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the 
offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who committed the 
predicate offence’. See also Keesoony S ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Laws: The Problems 
with Enforcement’ (2016) 19 Journal of Money Laundering Control. 
60 Madinger J Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators 3 ed (2012) at 1. 
61 Madinger (2012: 1). 
62 The barter system is one where an item is traded directly for another item instead of cash. See 
Heidensohn K, Jackman R & Zafiris N (eds) et al The Book of Money: A Visual Study of Economics 1979 
at 10-13 and Madinger J Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators 3 ed (2012) at 1. 
63 Madinger (2012: 2). 
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changing physical form of money, which includes coins, paper currency, credit cards and 
numbers merely reflected on a computer network.64 Although a comprehensive and 
enlightening discussion on money warrants a word limit well above the one set for this 
paper, for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of money laundering, what is 
important to note is the following: the money laundering process is not limited to cash; it 
involves any form of currency, be it gold, livestock, diamonds, credit card slips, etc.65 
The question that naturally follows is this: What exactly is money laundering? Although 
there is no common definition of what money laundering is, Turner describes money 
laundering as ‘the epitome of fraud methodology’.66 There is a wide pool of instruments 
that defines money laundering variously over different jurisdictions.67 The FATF defines 
 
money laundering in the following terms: ‘[T]he goal of a large number of criminal acts is to 
generate a profit for the individual or group that carries out the act. Money laundering is the 
processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. This process is of critical 
importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without jeopardising their 
source.’68 However, given the South African context in which this research is conducted, the 
definition of money laundering provided by South Africa’s main anti-money laundering law, 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act69 (FICA), will be used. 
FICA defines money laundering as any activity that has or is likely to have the effect of 
concealing or disguising the nature, location, source, disposition or movement of the 
 
 
64 Madinger (2012: 2). 
65 Madinger (2012: 4). 
66 Turner JE Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting and Resolving Financial Fraud (2011) at 
xi. 
67 Hinterseer K Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
Context (2002) at 16. 
68 Booth R, Farrel QC S & Bastable G et al Money Laundering Law and Regulation: A Practical Guide 
(2011) at 3. 
69 Act 38 of 2001. 
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proceeds of unlawful activities or any interest that any person has in such proceeds and it 
includes any activity which constitutes an offence in terms of section 64 of FICA or sections 
4, 5 and 6 of POCA 1998. Put simply, money laundering means ‘turning dirty money into 
clean money’.70 
2.2 A Brief Overview of the History of Money Laundering 
 
Money laundering was not a crime in any country before 1986, but is now criminalised in 
over 170 countries.71 People had been laundering money for centuries prior to the 1982 
United States v $4,255,625.3972 case that introduced and legally coined the process by 
which the true source of money is concealed as ‘money laundering’.73 Some 2000 years 
before the birth of Christ, merchants concealed the source of their money from the Chinese 
authorities who proscribed certain commercial trades, by investing their assets in other 
businesses outside China, proving that money laundering has an ancient history in different 
manifestations.74 
Although the practice of money laundering has been around for a very long time, the 
criminalisation and combating of the laundering of illicit proceeds is something of recent 
origin.75 Money laundering, in its modern manifestation, was first introduced in the United 
States of America (US) when the manufacturing, transportation and sale of alcoholic drinks 
exceeding the alcohol limit were prohibited in the 1920s.76 This prohibition led to the 
 
 
70 Tuba (2012: 105). 
71 Sharman JC ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States’ 
(2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly at 635. 
72 United States v $4,255,625.39 (1982) 551 F Supp. 
73 Hinterseer K Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal 
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establishment of an illegal alcohol market led by gangsters who used clotheslaundries and 
car-washing businesses to conceal the profit they made as a result of the illegal alcohol 
business.77 In the US case of United States v $4,255,625.39,78 Colombian citizens deposited 
money into a US bank account that was opened with the identity of a fictitious entity, which 
the court deemed as conduct that constituted money laundering.79 However, money 
laundering was criminalised only in 1986 by the US in response to its ‘war on drugs’80 
campaign, making it the first country to do so.81 When drug trafficking graduated to become 
an international problem, the US placed pressure on international bodies to combat drugs 
and this, in turn, led to the start of the international war against money laundering, but 
predominantly in the context of drug-related offences.82 
2.3 International Response to Money Laundering 
 
The globalisation of the economy facilitated the end of segregation that was caused by 
domestic financial markets and resulted in an integrated global economic system that led to 
an increase in trans-border investments, transferring of skills, knowledge, technology and 
employment.83 However, notwithstanding the advantages that accompany the globalisation 
of the financial system, it has become easier for criminals to launder and legitimise their ill- 
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82 Savona EU & De Feo MA ‘International Money Laundering Trends and Prevention/Control Policies’ in 
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gotten gains.84 Money laundering is an international problem that affects individual 
countries, hence an international response through the co-operation of individual states is 
imperative, for the wider the fight against money laundering, the greater the impact it will 
have in suppressing this criminal activity.85 
Given the fact that money laundering was a problem largely experienced by rich countries, 
the G7 came under pressure to join the war against money laundering, which is when the 
FATF emerged.86As stated in Chapter One, the FATF introduced 40 Recommendations that 
set the international standards for national anti-money laundering legislation.87 Although 
 
the international anti-money laundering standards are not legally binding on states, when 
states fail to join the war against money laundering, they subject themselves to economic 
sanctions that include the decrease of international transactions in these countries, making 
it almost impossible for the banks of these countries to clear their funds through foreign 
banks.88 
2.3.1 The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 
The international efforts to combat money laundering were introduced in 1988 upon the 
adoption of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances89 (UN Drug Convention) by the United Nations. The UN Drug Convention 
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essentially requires states to co-operate with one another in order to freeze and forfeit any 
illicit proceeds.90 However, the latter convention does not specifically make mention of the 
term ‘money laundering’.91 The UN Drug Convention requires states to criminalise money 
laundering and to deem money laundering an extraditable crime.92 This Convention was the 
first to deal with the criminalisation of money laundering.93 The Convention paved the way 
for the international anti-money laundering system by placing a duty on all states to 
criminalise the laundering of drug-related proceeds.94 Although the UN Drug Convention is 
primarily concerned with the war against drugs, it provides a template for money laundering 
offences in Article 3 of the Convention, which was subsequently adopted by the FATF.95 
2.3.2 The Basel Committee Statement of Principles 
 
The UN Drug Convention was not the only instrument that contributed to the fight against 
money laundering in 1988. The Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices adopted a Statement of Principles which dealt with customer identification, banks 
co-operating with law enforcement agencies and complying with the law in order to combat 
money laundering.96 The representatives of the central banks and supervisory authorities of 
the Group of Ten Nations constitute the Basel Committee that essentially discusses banking 
supervision.97 It was in the 1980s that the Basel Committee became aware of criminals who 
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used their financial systems and institutions to launder their illegal proceeds.98 In response, 
the Basel Committee adopted the Statement of Principles in order to ensure that the banks 
are not used in the process of laundering and hiding illicit proceeds.99 
2.3.3 The Financial Action Task Force 
 
As explained above, the FATF was established by the Ministers of the G7 in response to the 
prevalence of money laundering.100 As an independent task force of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the FATF is tasked with a mandate to 
promote and develop anti-money laundering measures through its Recommendations at 
both national and international level.101 After the terrorist attacks were carried out against 
the US on 11 September 2001, the mandate of the FATF was extended to include the fight 
against terrorist financing.102 The FATF consequently developed nine Special 
Recommendations to combat terrorist financing.103 The FATF Recommendations on money 
laundering and terrorist financing were adopted not only by the IMF and the World Bank in 
2002,104 but also were endorsed also by the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 
1617 of 29 July 2005.105 
The FATF did not only develop Recommendations to combat money laundering and the 
 
financing of terrorism, but also subjects States to mutual evaluations and self-assessments 
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on how they implement the Recommendations, which essentially encourage States to 
improve their fight against money laundering.106 However, the burden of implementing the 
Recommendations is imposed mainly on the private sector.107 Even though the FATF 
Recommendations are not legally binding upon states, so far the Recommendations have 
been domesticated by more than 180 countries and are accepted as the international anti- 
money laundering and combating of terrorist financing standards.108 The Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
and on the Financing of Terrorism109 obligates the EU Member States to adopt and 
implement the FATF Recommendations.110 Thus, even though the Recommendations are 
not, technically, hard law, based on their universal implementation, they are accepted as 
such. 
The FATF acknowledges that countries do not have the same legal, administrative, and 
operational framework or identical financial system.111 Thus, countries are unable to 
implement identical measures.112 For this very reason, the FATF recommends that countries 
enforce measures that are adapted to the specific circumstances of every individual state.113 
Before countries adopt measures to combat money laundering, they must set out first to 
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identify, assess and understand the risks that accompany money laundering.114 The FATF 
recommends that countries adopt a risk-based approach that will allow them to adopt more 
flexible measures within the confines of the FATF standards.115 The risk-based approach 
allows countries to utilise their resources in the most effective way.116 This is because the 
risk- based approach entails applying 90 per cent of resources towards 10 per cent of 
business that constitutes the most serious risk.117 
The FATF 40 Recommendations were first published in 1990 as an initiative to combat the 
laundering of drug proceeds.118 Given the evolving money laundering trends, the 
Recommendations were revised in 1996.119 They were updated comprehensively in both 
2003 and 2012.120 They will be subject to changes in the light of the evolving nature of 
money laundering techniques and the threats they pose to the world economy.121 
2.3.4 EU Convention and Directives 
 
In 1990 the Council of the European Union adopted the Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime122 and issued the EU Member States 
with Money Laundering Directives in 1991, 2001 and 2005.123 The latter was done in order 
to ensure that the Recommendations were domesticated by the EU Member States, as the 
Recommendations were adopted by the European Union as requirements of the Directives 
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that were issued.124 It is after the Recommendations and latter initiatives of the European 
Union that the anti-money laundering measures became part and parcel of the legal 
framework of countries across the world, hence the foundation for the international 
countermeasures to money laundering were established between 1988 and 1991.125 
2.3.5 The Egmont Group 
 
The transfer of money may happen within a matter of seconds across various jurisdictions, a 
fact that requires investigative authorities to have access to an instant exchange of 
information, which is where the Egmont Group plays an important role.126 The Egmont 
Group was established in 1995 as an informal government body after international 
organisations and government agencies met in order to seek solutions to the problem of 
laundering illicit proceeds.127 The Egmont Group consists of Financial Intelligence Units 
(FIUs) that are located in countries throughout the world.128 A FIU is a central, national 
 
agency that collects, analyses and disseminates information regarding any suspicious 
financial transactions and any money laundering or terrorist financing activities.129 This 
information is made readily available to all other FIUs throughout the world, thus making it 
easier for investigative authorities to track the illicit funds and, in turn, enhance the fight 
against money laundering.130 
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2.3.6 United Nations Convention against Organised Crime 
 
The United Nations Convention against Organised Crime (Palermo Convention)131 was 
created in order to foster international co-operation in order to combat and prevent 
organised crime,132 to which money laundering was identified as a form of organised 
crime.133 The Palermo Convention endorsed the principles developed by the Basel 
Committee, FATF Recommendations and initiatives of the European Union, as explained 
above, and included measures to combat and prevent money laundering.134 
The money laundering offences in the Palermo Convention, although similar to the money 
laundering offences listed in Article 3 of UN Drug Convention, have been broadened in that 
they do not relate to drug trafficking offences only but to all serious crimes within the 
context of the Convention.135 Thus, although the Palermo Convention endorsed the anti- 
money laundering measures developed in the 1980s and 1990s, it extended the scope of the 
anti-money laundering measures and, as a result, widened the reach of the measures to 
combat and prevent money laundering. 
2.3.7 The Wolfsberg Group 
 
The Wolfsberg Group consists of 13 global banks which work together in order to achieve 
the same common goal, namely, to provide guidance and develop a framework for the 
financial service industry standards where there are financial crime risks, specifically Know 
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Your Customer, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing policies.136 The 
group was established in 2000 after the global banks met in Switzerland where they 
developed and adopted the Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private 
Banking.137 What the Wolfsberg Group attempts to attain through its primary goal, is to 
cultivate a culture where the regulatory agencies adopt a risk-based approach to money 
laundering at both national and international level.138 This is reflected in its Guidelines of 
2000, the standards it sets on the Know Your Customer (KYC), Common Customer Due 
Diligence (CDD), training and other means of monitoring.139 The Wolfsberg Group continues 
to play a crucial role in furthering the fight against money laundering. 
 
2.3.8 The International Monetary Fund 
 
The IMF is an organisation tasked with fostering global monetary co-operation between 
states, reducing poverty, ensuring financial stability, and facilitating international trade.140 
The IMF essentially acts in the interests of the global economy. Created in 1945, the 
organisation enjoys a membership of 189 countries to whom it is accountable and governed 
by.141 
The IMF has been involved in combating money laundering at a national level for a very long 
time.142 Given its global membership, the IMF is a natural forum where countries exchange 
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the necessary information about issues that threaten the stability of the international 
economy, such as money laundering. In 1999 the IMF, together with the World Bank, 
established the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) that evaluates the financial 
system of countries and assists countries to address the weaknesses identified in their 
financial system.143 The IMF Executive Board decided to include the FATF Recommendations 
as part of IMF work and created a donor-supported trust to render financial assistance in 
anti-money laundering efforts.144 
2.4 South Africa’s Response to Money Laundering 
 
Before the 1990s, people who laundered illicit proceeds were prosecuted as accessories 
after the fact in terms of South African common law.145 This is illustrated in S v Dustigar.146 
Known as the biggest robbery case in South African history, 19 people were convicted of 
numerous crimes committed during a robbery.147 Of the 19 accused, seven used their banks 
accounts to launder money and were convicted of money laundering in terms of the South 
African common law, as accessories after the fact. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s marked an important period for the development of anti-money 
laundering measures at the international level, as discussed above. South Africa adopted the 
international approach to combating money laundering by developing a statutory 
framework for the prevention and prosecution of the crime.148 The very first statutory 
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money laundering offences were created by way of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act149 
which introduced money laundering as an independent offence.150 The latter Act 
criminalised money laundering in the context of drug-related offences and required the 
appropriate instances to report any suspicious transactions, but only insofar as they were 
connected to the profits of any drug-related crimes.151 The reach of the South African 
authorities in combating money laundering was, therefore, very limited.152 In response to 
 
this limitation, the Proceeds of Crime Act153 was enacted. This law repealed the Drugs and 
Drug Trafficking Act entirely.154 The Proceeds of Crime Act broadened the fight against 
money laundering by introducing a money laundering offence that was not restricted to 
drug-related offences, but this extension still proved ineffective in combating money 
laundering in South Africa.155 In an effort to combat both organised crime and money 
laundering, South Africa repealed the Proceeds of Crime Act when it adopted POCA.156 
 
2.4.1 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
 
When POCA came into effect on 21 January 1999, it became the main statute criminalising 
money laundering in South Africa.157 Two sets of money laundering offences are created by 
POCA.158 The first set consists of general money laundering offences.159 Here money 
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laundering is criminalised under three separate provisions of POCA.160 The second set of 
money laundering offences concerns the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering.161 
Money laundering is criminalised under chapter 3 of POCA, specifically sections 4, 5 and 6. 
According to section 4 of POCA, a person is guilty of money laundering where any person 
knows or reasonably ought to have known that property is or forms part of illicit proceeds 
and such person continues to commit acts in connection with such property, which is likely 
to have or has the following two effects.162 Firstly, it results in the concealment or disguising 
of the nature, location, movement, ownership or interest a party may have in respect of 
such property.163 Secondly, it may also result in assisting or enabling a person who has 
committed crimes in South Africa or abroad, to evade prosecution, diminish or eliminate any 
property acquired as a result of any proscribed act committed.164 Here the accused is the 
perpetrator who commits the predicate offence and the one who disguises or conceals the 
proceeds of the predicate offence.165 Predicate offences are criminal offences that give rise 
to money laundering because the predicate offences generate the illegal proceeds,      
which, in turn, generate the need to have the money laundered.166 The De Vries v S167 case 
illustrates the prerequisites of section 4 of POCA. In this case, Achmat Mather was convicted 
of both theft as a continuing crime and money laundering in terms of section 4 of POCA. 
Mather purchased stolen cigarettes from a gang who hijacked trucks transporting cargo of 
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Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 6. 
161 Dealt with in Chap 2 of POCA. See De Koker ‘Money Laundering in South Africa’ (2002) Institute for 
Security Studies at 6. 
162 Sec 4(a) – (b) of POCA. 
163 Sec 4(b)(i) of POCA. 
164 Sec 4(b)(ii) of POCA. 
165 Tuba (2011: 109). 
166 Unger B ‘Implementing Money Laundering’ in Masciandaro D, Takats E & Unger B Black Finance: The 
Economics of Money Laundering (2007) at 114. 
167 De Vries v S (130/11) [2011] ZASCA 162. 
 
 
 
 
27  
the British American Tobacco Company of South Africa. Mather argued that because the 
charge of theft and money laundering both flowed from his dealings with the stolen 
cigarettes, he ought to be convicted of money laundering only and not theft.168 
The court referred to section 4 of POCA and held that Mather made himself guilty of theft as 
a continuing crime the moment he received the cigarettes, knowing that it was stolen. The 
court went on to hold that he acted in contravention of section 4 when he used the stolen 
cigarettes as though they were legally obtained, thereby concealing their illegal nature and 
assisting the gang which stole the cigarettes. The court held that the two crimes ultimately 
involved different actions and theft required a different element from the crime of money 
laundering.169 
Anyone who assists another party to benefit from the proceeds of criminal activities will be 
prosecuted for money laundering.170 Section 5 provides that where any party besides the 
perpetrator enters into any agreement, transaction, or arrangement with anyone in order to 
retain, control, or make the illegal proceeds available to the perpetrator, such party will be 
guilty of money laundering.171 Here the third party either knew or reasonably ought to have 
known that the perpetrator, in whose favour the third party is acting, obtained the proceeds 
from illegal activities.172 
The third instance where a person may be guilty of a money laundering offence is where 
that person acquires, uses or is in possession of proceeds of illegal activities, knowing or 
reasonably ought to have known that the proceeds derive from the unlawful activities of 
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another party.173 Self and third-party money laundering are dealt with in section 4.174 
However, sections 5 and 6 only deal with third-party money laundering.175 According to the 
FATF, the fact that section 6 fails to extend liability to the perpetrator of the predicate 
offence for the acquisition, possession or use of the ill-gotten proceeds, represents a gap in 
the section.176 However, South African authorities argue that section 6 does not criminalise 
money laundering. Instead, section 6 is deemed complementary to section 4, as it applies to 
people who are indirectly associated with money laundering and where there is insufficient 
evidence to secure a conviction in terms of section 4.177 
South African authorities stated that the language used in both the UN Drug Convention and 
the Palermo Convention suggests that the acquisition, use or possession of proceeds of 
illegal activities apply only to any party other than the person who committed the predicate 
offence. The South African authorities went on to say that charging a perpetrator under 
both sections 4 and 6 would amount to a duplication of charges, which is in contravention of 
South Africa’s constitutional principles and legal system.178 For purposes of this paper, the 
latter issue will not be considered any further except to state that, notwithstanding the issue 
around section 6 of POCA, it was found to be largely compliant with Recommendation     
1.179 
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In all three instances where conduct constitutes a money laundering offence, a party may be 
prosecuted for money laundering only where that party knew or reasonably ought to have 
known that the property constituted the proceeds of illegal activities.180 According to section 
1(2) of POCA, a party has knowledge of a particular fact where that person possesses actual 
knowledge of that fact or where that person fails to confirm the existence of                     
such fact, or where that person suspected the reasonable existence of the said fact. On the 
other hand, a person may be convicted of money laundering where that person negligently 
failed to realise that the property was or formed part of the proceeds of illegal 
activities.181An accused may rely on the fact that she or he reported a suspicion or 
knowledge of a fact in terms of section 29 of FICA as a defence against a charge of money 
laundering due to negligence.182 
The proceeds of unlawful activities consist of property that goes beyond money. Any 
movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing, including rights, privileges, securities 
and claims constitute “property”.183 Any property or part thereof, including any service, 
advantage or reward that derives directly or indirectly from illegal activities committed in 
South Africa or abroad, is deemed as proceeds of any activity that is criminalised or 
prohibited in terms of South African law.184 South Africa adopts an “all crimes approach”, 
meaning that the ambit of the money laundering offence applies to any conduct 
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criminalised under South African law.185 The penalties for money laundering offences are 
anything but lenient.186 Any person who is convicted of money laundering in terms of 
sections 4,5, and 6 may be fined an amount not exceeding R100 million or imprisoned for a 
period of not more than 30 years.187 If the money laundering offence was committed in 
relation to proceeds of racketeering, the accused will be fined no more than R1 billion or 
face life imprisonment.188 The broad ambit of the POCA provisions have enabled the South 
African authorities to enforce them with ease.189 However, South Africa’s lack of general 
money laundering framework hindered the effectiveness of POCA.190 The adoption of FICA 
closed the gaps caused by the lack of a general money laundering control framework.191 
2.4.2 The Financial Intelligence Centre 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) is the Financial Intelligence Unit of South Africa.192  
The Centre is established and regulated by FICA.193 FICA established also the Counter-Money 
Laundering Advisory Council194 and it regulates access to information and obligations for 
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money laundering control.195 The creation of a financial intelligence unit can be traced back 
to 1996, when the South African Law Commission published a Money Laundering Control 
Bill.196 Unfortunately, due to tardiness on the part of the government, the necessary 
mechanisms and structures to enhance the fight against money laundering were approved 
only in 2002, when FICA came into effect.197 
The Financial Intelligence Centre became a member of the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units in 2003.198 The primary objective of the Centre is to render assistance in 
the identification of illicit proceeds and the following up of money laundering activities, 
financing of terrorism and other related activities.199 The Centre is also required to provide 
information it collects to the respective South African authorities responsible for combating 
money laundering.200 Moreover, the Centre is obligated to exchange information with 
similar anti-money laundering bodies, to supervise and enforce compliance with FICA, and 
to assist other supervisory bodies in carrying out the latter function.201 
The Centre collects, retains, compiles, and analyses all the information it obtains by virtue of 
FICA.202 However, it bears noting that the Centre does not investigate money laundering 
offences.203 It furnishes only relevant information, advice, and assistance to intelligence 
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services, investigative authorities and the South African Revenue Services (SARS).204 
Furthermore, the Centre provides only guidance to and monitors accountable institutions 
and is not empowered to supervise them.205 FICA provides for the general money 
laundering control framework by placing various entities under a plethora of obligations.206 
These entities have a duty to identify clients,207 keep records,208 to report, and to provide 
access to information.209 They are required also to implement measures to promote 
compliance by accountable institutions210 and to supervise and make referrals where 
necessary.211 
POCA and FICA make up the core structure of South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
regime.212 The general money laundering offences as defined by POCA and FICA provide for 
a detailed money laundering control framework that gives rise to obligations that are 
imposed on businesses.213 Louis de Koker opines that both POCA and FICA provide for a 
comprehensive anti-money laundering framework in South Africa.214 However, De Koker 
warns that the constitutionality of the provisions in FICA and POCA may be challenged – a 
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warning that has already become a reality when parties accused of fraud, corruption and 
money laundering challenged section 2(2) of POCA.215 
De Koker recommends that the relevant bodies exercise the powers conferred upon them, 
taking into account the constitutional rights of others.216 De Koker also suggests that the 
relevant bodies exercise powers that are the least controversial.217 Although South Africa 
has a comprehensive legal framework that enables it to combat money laundering, much 
depends on how it is implemented.218 In addressing the shortcomings in South Africa’s anti- 
money laundering legislation, this paper will address both POCA and FICA in greater detail in 
Chapter Three. 
 
2.5 Process of Money Laundering 
 
Many people comprehend the process of money laundering to be a complex one, a process 
that is complicated to understand.219 But the process of money laundering is, in fact, 
common and relatively easy to understand.220 Although the money laundering process has 
been encapsulated in a number of steps,221 the process is primarily a triadic one, a trio of 
steps that consist of the following: placement, layering and integration.222 
In order to understand the money laundering process, consider the following hypothetical 
situation: Mr Merchant, a successful drug dealer on the Cape Flats accumulates large sums 
215 See the case of Savoi v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 (5) BCLR 606 (CC). 
216 De Koker L ‘Money Laundering Control: the South African Model’ (2003) 6 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control at 176. 
217 De Koker L ‘Money Laundering Control: the South African Model’ (2003) 6 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control at 177. 
218 De Koker ‘Money Laundering in South Africa’ (2002) Institute for Security Studies at 48. 
219 Turner (2011: 1). 
220 Turner (2011: 1). 
221 Woods BF The Art and Science of Money Laundering: Inside the Commerce of the International 
Narcotics Traffickers (1998) at 1. 
222 Savona EU & De Feo MA ‘International Money Laundering Trends and Prevention/Control Policies’ in 
Savona EU (ed), Bassiouni MC & Bernasconi P Responding to Money Laundering: International 
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of money as a result of his drug dealing, but he is unable to explain how he came to be in 
possession of that money. Naturally, Mr Merchant wants to avoid attracting unwanted 
attention, so he tries to conceal the criminal proceeds by converting the cash into another 
form that would enable him to spend his money without raising any suspicion, which is 
known as placement.223 Mr Merchant wants to separate himself from the dirty money as far 
as possible; this constitutes the second stage, layering.224 Mr Merchant then integrates the 
 
dirty money into the lawful economy by making it appear as if he came into possession of 
the money in a legitimate way, which constitutes the stage of integration.225 
Placement of the ill-gained money into the legitimate financial system initiates the money 
laundering process.226 Placement is the stage where the perpetrator wants to hide the 
money accumulated as a result of criminal activity by depositing the money into a bank 
account, through smurfing,227 placing the money in a trust account or purchasing high value 
items such as paintings or jewellery.228 Money launderers are said to be most vulnerable at 
the placement stage because they attempt to move the illicit proceeds into the legitimate 
financial system by disposing a significant amount of cash into the financial system, which 
attracts the attention of authorities.229 The perils that lurk at the placement stage make it 
 
 
 
 
 
223 Madinger (2012: 7). 
224 Tuba (2012: 106). 
225 Turner (2011: 8). 
226 Hamman & Koen& Koen (2012: 80). 
227 Smurfing involves the use of numerous anonymous people to divide a huge transaction into small 
parts by depositing a portion of the transaction into each of the anonymous people’s account in order 
to avoid raising any flags by not making any money transfer that exceeds the legal limit and would 
otherwise be reported. See Savona EU & De Feo MA ‘International Money Laundering Trends and 
Prevention/Control Policies’ in Savona EU (ed), Bassiouni MC & Bernasconi P Responding to Money 
Laundering: International Perspectives (1997) at 2 - 23. 
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the most difficult stage for the money launderer, for law enforcement agencies want to 
exploit the launderer’s vulnerability at this stage.230 
The first step of the money laundering process is then followed by what is called layering.231 
In the name of obscuring the true source of money, launderers layer their money by 
creating various layers of financial transactions designed specifically to interrupt any audit 
trail.232 The money launderers can layer the money by performing multiple transnational 
transactions.233 Moving money from one account to another, purchasing property and 
 
legitimate businesses and the purchase of equipment constitute only a handful of the 
undesirably creative ways in which perpetrators launder their money.234 The more layers 
the launderers add to the money laundering process, the more difficult it becomes to follow 
the money trail and to prove that the money is the proceeds of criminal activity.235 
Integration is the step that concludes the money laundering process.236 This is the stage at 
which the money launderer, confident that the risk of being caught is not imminent, 
reintroduces the money which has been severed from its illicit origins, into the economy.237 
Financial instruments such as securities, bills of guarantees, cheques, and letters of credit 
are used to integrate the dirty money. It becomes almost impossible to prove that the 
money, which now appears legitimate, has a criminal provenance.238 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE SHORTCOMINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA’S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIME 
 
South Africa’s legal and institutional anti-money laundering framework is accepted as a 
relatively strong and comprehensive one.239 Some go as far as stating that South Africa’s 
money laundering control model is more comprehensive than that of the other FATF 
member states.240 Compliments aside, the South African anti-money laundering regime still 
requires improvement. This is because the FATF, together with ESAAMLG, identified certain 
deficiencies in South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime when it underwent its last 
mutual evaluation in 2008.241 
The FATF rates a country’s compliance with its Recommendations according to four levels, 
namely, compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, and non-compliant, and in certain 
exceptional cases, it may be deemed ‘not applicable’.242 Having undergone its second 
evaluation in 2008, in relation to the 2003 FATF Recommendations, South Africa was found 
to be compliant with nine of the Recommendations, largely compliant with 10 
Recommendations, partially compliant with 14 of the Recommendations and non-compliant 
with seven of the Recommendations.243 In addressing the shortcomings in South Africa’s 
 
 
 
 
 
239 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 8. See also De Koker L ‘Money Laundering Control: the South 
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anti-money laundering legislation, reference will be made to some of the recommendations 
to which South Africa is non-compliant and partially compliant. 
3.1 Politically Exposed Persons 
 
Recommendation 6244 requires financial institutions to develop appropriate risk 
management systems that enable them to identify politically exposed persons (PEPs).245 
Where a customer is identified as a PEP, the financial institution must request the approval 
of senior management before it establishes a business relationship with such customer.246 In 
the event that the financial institution establishes a business relationship with a PEP, the 
institution must take reasonable measures to establish the source of the PEP’s wealth and 
conduct ongoing enhanced monitoring of its relationship with the PEP.247 
A politically exposed person is defined as an individual who is or was entrusted with 
prominent public functions by a foreign country or domestically.248 Examples of PEPs include 
heads of states or governments, senior politicians, senior military, judicial or government 
officials, senior executives of state owned corporations and officials of important political 
parties.249 Individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent function by an 
international organisation also constitute PEPs.250 There is, however, no universal definition 
 
 
 
244 Recommendation 6 applies to financial and non-financial businesses and professions so designated. 
See the interpretive note annexed to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 21. 
245 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty Recommendations 2003 at 3. 
246 Recommendation 6(b) of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 3. 
247 Recommendation 6(c) and (d) of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 3. 
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of a PEP.251 South Africa defines a PEP as a natural person who has been or is presently 
assigned to a prominent public position in a specific country.252 
There is currently no law in South Africa that places an obligation on accountable 
institutions to identify PEPs and to adopt the necessary measures as required by 
Recommendation 6.253 Although the Financial Intelligence Centre of South Africa published 
a Guidance Note254 in 2005 on client identification, it is not applicable to all accountable 
 
institutions and it is not enforceable against the institutions to which it applies.255 Thus, 
there is no binding obligation on the accountable institutions to identify PEPs and comply 
with the rest of Recommendation 6.256 It is for this reason that South Africa was found to be 
non-compliant with Recommendation 6.257 
In acknowledging this shortcoming, the Standing Committee on Finance introduced 
enhanced measures and ongoing due diligence procedures that accountable institutions 
have to adopt when establishing a business relationship with people in prominent private or 
public sector positions.258 The proposed FICA amendments submitted in 2015 were 
approved by Parliament and have subsequently been referred to the President for his assent 
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(Accessed on 28 October 2016). See also Ahlers (2013: 68) 
253 Recommendation 6(b) of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 3. See also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti- 
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254 It was published in July 2005 and is titled as Financial Intelligence Centre Guidance Note 3: Guidance 
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https://www.fic.gov.za/Pages/FAQ.aspx?p=2 (Accessed on 28 October 2016). 
257 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 104. 
258 Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill 2015 ISBN 978-1-4850-0000-0 at 36. 
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and signature.259 However, there has been controversy around the adoption of the FICA 
Amendment Bill 2015. The Progressive Professionals Forum pleaded with the President not 
to sign the Bill into law.260 He responded positively to the objection raised by the 
Progressive Professionals Forum by delaying the promulgation of the Bill. The failure to 
place accountable institutions under a legal obligation to identify PEPs and to take the 
necessary measures will remain a shortcoming in South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
legislation until such time as the President signs the FICA Amendment Bill 2015 into law. 
3.2 Correspondent Banking 
 
Correspondent banking refers to a relationship between banks, for example, where Bank A 
(the “correspondent bank”) renders its service to Bank B (the “respondent bank”).261 Usually 
the large international banks act as correspondent banks for numerous banks around the 
world.262 Recommendation 7 provides that an obligation must be placed on financial 
institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence on cross-border correspondent banking and 
other similar relationships.263 This means that the correspondent bank must gather 
sufficient information in relation to the respondent bank, specifically to determine the 
reputation and supervision of the respondent bank and if it is subject to anti-money 
laundering investigation or regulatory actions.264 The correspondent bank must also assess 
 
 
259 Financial Intelligence Centre ‘Notice: Amendment of the Schedules to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
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the anti-money laundering control of the respondent bank and obtain approval from senior 
management when it intends to form new correspondent relationships.265 Furthermore, 
financial institutions must also document the responsibilities that each bank bears.266 With 
regard to “payable-through accounts”, the correspondent bank must be satisfied that the 
verification of identification and conducting of ongoing due diligence on customers that 
have direct access to its accounts, are done by the respondent bank, which must be able to 
furnish the correspondent bank with customer identification data.267 
In South Africa there is no law or regulation that obligates financial institutions to conduct 
enhanced due diligence on cross-border correspondent banking and similar relationships.268 
It is for this reason that the FATF, together with ESAAMLG, rated South Africa as non- 
compliant with regard to Recommendation 7.269 However, it must be acknowledged that 
even though there is no legal obligation to do so, South African financial institutions choose 
to implement enhanced measures as regards their cross-border correspondent 
relationships.270 Furthermore, Guidance Note 3 deals with correspondent banking by 
referring banks to the requirements of Recommendation 7 and encourages banks to take 
precaution where they have a relationship with respondent banks that are located in 
jurisdictions that are listed as “non-cooperative” or have weak Know Your Customer (KYC) 
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standards.271 Guidance Note 3 also refers banks to the Basel Committee Core Principles and 
Wolfsberg Principles in order to ensure that South African financial institutions adopt 
measures in relation to their correspondent banking relationships that are in line with the 
international standards.272 Although Guidance Note 3 is not legally enforceable, the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD) stated that its anti-money laundering supervision benchmark 
is set against the Guidance Notes and the revised 2012 FATF Recommendations.273 Financial 
institutions that fail to adopt the measures advocated in the Guidance Notes are required to 
furnish the BSD with an explanation.274 In this way, financial institutions are pressured to 
comply with Recommendation 7 even if no such obligation exists in law or regulation. 
However, FICA must be amended to place an obligation on financial institutions to comply 
with Recommendation 7. 
South Africa was found to be partially compliant with Recommendation 18.275 This is 
because the financial institutions are not specifically prohibited from establishing or 
continuing correspondent banking relationships with shell banks, even though South African 
licencing requirements prevent the establishment of shell banks.276 Moreover, South African 
financial institutions are not required to ensure that they establish correspondent relations 
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only with foreign financial institutions that do not permit their accounts to be used by shell 
banks.277 
3.3 The Risk-Based Approach 
 
The 2003 FATF Recommendations made provision for the risk-based approach only in 
certain areas.278 However, this changed in 2012 when the FATF revised and updated its 
Recommendations in an attempt to strengthen the global fight against financial crime.279 
One of the primary changes introduced by the revised FATF Recommendations is the 
increased emphasis they place on the risk-based approach.280 The risk-based approach is 
now deemed as the “essential foundation” of a country’s anti-money laundering 
framework.281 
A risk-based approach means that countries, together with their competent authorities and 
accountable institutions, identify, assess and understand the money laundering risks that 
they face and consequently adopt anti-money laundering measures that are proportionate 
to the risks.282 The risk-based approach enables countries to utilise their resources in the 
most cost-effective way.283 It is important to note that while the risk-based approach 
 
requires a greater amount of resources to be directed at higher risk situations, it does not 
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280 Financial Action Task Force ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector’ October 2014 at 
6. 
281 Recommendation 1 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
282 Financial Action Task Force ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector’ October 2014 at 
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exempt countries, competent authorities, and accountable institutions from mitigating low 
money laundering risks.284 
The accountable institutions in South Africa are not compelled by law to apply a risk-based 
approach to their anti-money laundering efforts.285 Consequently, some accountable 
institutions subject all their customers to the same standard criteria.286 This “one-size-fits- 
all” approach has its disadvantages. For instance, a retired state pensioner would be treated 
precisely in the same way as a businessman who receives large amounts of money from a 
country notorious for producing blood diamonds.287 The implication of the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach is that the KYC, identification and account monitoring principles will apply equally 
to both customers.288 This means that an already limited amount of resources will be  
wasted on the low-risk customers who are unnecessarily subjected to stringent scrutiny.289 
The risk-based approach introduces an alternative that negates the adverse effects of a non- 
risk-based approach. The risk-based approach provides for a system where 90 per cent of 
the available resources are applied to 10 per cent of customers who constitute the greatest 
risk.290 This would result in less paperwork, more pleasant customer service, and ensuring 
that the ‘greatest risk receives the greatest attention’.291 Given the importance and 
 
advantages of the risk-based approach, the fact that it is not advocated, prioritised, and 
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embedded in its legislation constitutes a shortcoming in South Africa’s anti-money 
laundering framework. 
Cognisant of the latter shortcoming, Clause 9 was included in the most recent proposed 
amendments to FICA. Clause 9 of the FICA Amendment Bill 2015 remedies this shortcoming 
by making provision for a risk-based approach to CDD.292 However, not compelling 
accountable institutions to apply a risk-based approach will remain a shortcoming in South 
Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation until such time as the proposed amendments 
become operative. In the meantime, accountable institutions, notably the financial 
institutions, have taken the initiative to apply a risk-based approach to their anti-money 
laundering measures. 293 
3.4 National Risk Assessment 
 
Countries are tasked with conducting a national risk assessment of the money laundering 
and financing of terrorism risks posed in their respective countries.294 Here countries must 
identify and assess the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks on a continuous 
basis.295 The national risk assessment serves three main purposes. Firstly, it provides 
information on the potential changes to the country’s anti-money laundering laws, 
regulations and other measures.296 Secondly, it plays an imperative role in the successful 
implementation of the risk-based approach to money laundering as it helps establish the 
high, medium and low money laundering risks.297 Thirdly, it provides the accountable 
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institutions with the necessary information when a money laundering risk assessment is 
conducted by them.298 
Although informal discussions have taken place between the Financial Intelligence Centre 
and law enforcement agencies, South Africa is yet to launch a formal national risk 
assessment of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks present in the 
country.299 South African authorities stated that they intend to conduct the risk assessment 
in an inclusive manner, by allowing the involvement all government agencies that play a role 
in combating money laundering, but failed to shed light on the role of the accountable 
institutions in the private sector.300 The more the South African authorities delay the launch 
of a national risk assessment, the more difficult the task will be for accountable institutions 
to apply a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering measures. In February 2003, the 
FATF published a Guidance Note for countries conducting national risk assessments, one 
that South Africa may refer to in order to accelerate the launch of its national risk 
assessment.301 
3.5 Beneficial Ownership 
 
A beneficial owner is someone who essentially owns or controls a customer and/or the 
natural person on whose behalf a transaction is concluded.302 A person who exercises 
ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement also constitutes a beneficial 
 
 
298 Interpretive Note to Recommendation 1 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations at 32. 
299 Know Your Country ‘South Africa anti-money laundering summary’, available at 
www.knowyourcountry.com/southafrica1111.html (Accessed on 22 September 2016). See also 
Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 10. 
300 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 10. 
301 Financial Action Task Force ‘Guidance on National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk 
Assessment’ February 2013. 
302 General Glossary - International Standards on Combating Money Laundering the Financing of 
Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012) at 110. 
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owner.303 Put simply, a beneficial owner refers to someone who ultimately controls an asset 
and is able to benefit from it.304 In the context of the money laundering crime, a beneficial 
owner is someone who controls or has an interest in illicit proceeds but conceals this fact 
through the misuse of corporate vehicles.305 Corporate vehicles refer primarily to 
companies, foundations, trusts, fictitious entities and unincorporated economic 
organisations.306 
Beneficial ownership in the money laundering context is dealt with under 
Recommendations 5, 34, and 35 of the 2003 FICA Recommendations. Recommendation 5 is 
incorporated as Recommendation 10 under the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
Similarly, Recommendations 34 and 35 are incorporated as Recommendation 24 and 25 
respectively under the 2012 FATF Recommendations. Given the increased risk that 
accompany alternative money laundering techniques, the use of corporate vehicles has 
become the preferred method to launder ill-gotten gains.307 In the light of this, when the 
FATF revised its Recommendations in 2012, it expanded significantly the ambit of the 
requirements in relation to the establishment of the beneficial owner.308 In particular, 
Recommendation 10309 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations provides for a step-by- 
 
step process that must be adopted when identifying the beneficial owner.310 Moreover, 
 
 
 
 
303 General Glossary - International Standards on Combating Money Laundering the Financing of 
Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012) at 110. 
304 Van der Does de Willebois E, Halter EM & Harrison RA et al The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use 
Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (2011) at 18. 
305 Van der Does de Willebois E, Halter EM & Harrison RA et al The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use 
Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (2011) at 17. 
306 Van der Does de Willebois E, Halter EM & Harrison RA et al The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use 
Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (2011) at 33. 
307 Van der Does de Willebois E, Halter EM & Harrison RA et al The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use 
Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (2011) at 11. 
308 Parkman (2012: 33). 
309 Recommendation 10 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
310 Parkman (2012: 33). 
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countries are now required to make provision for a system that keeps record of and 
provides information on beneficial ownership.311 
Recommendations 24 and 25312 require countries and their accountable institutions to 
adopt measures that will establish the identity of the beneficial owner and any information 
in relation to the beneficial owner or the corporate vehicle being used.313 These 
Recommendations require the accountable institutions to adopt the measures provided in 
both Recommendations 10 and 22.314 The FATF ranked South Africa as non-compliant with 
respect to the recommendations pertaining to beneficial owners when it evaluated South 
Africa in both 2003 and 2008.315 
There is no law that requires accountable institutions to establish and verify the identity of 
beneficial owners.316 Accountable institutions are required only to identify and verify the 
identity of any person who acts on behalf of the customer.317 However, where the customer 
is a legal person, the accountable institution is not required to establish the identity of the 
natural person controlling the legal person.318 Moreover, there are only limited measures 
that ensure accurate, adequate, and timely information on the beneficial owner.319 It is for 
this reason that South Arica was found to be non-compliant. Notwithstanding the fact that 
 
 
 
 
311 Parkman (2012: 33). 
312 Recommendation 24 and 25 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
313 See Recommendation 24 and 25 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
314 Recommendation 12 of the 2003 FATF Recommendations is adopted as Recommendation 22 of the 
2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
315 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 29 para 71. 
316 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 95 para 405. 
317 Sec 21 of FICA. 
318 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 95 para 406. 
319 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 222. 
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South Africa’s shortcomings in relation to the beneficial owner are addressed in the FICA 
Amendment Bill 2015, it will remain a deficiency until the amendments are promulgated. 
Given the absence of legal requirements to identify and verify the identity of beneficial 
owners, accountable institutions implement a variety of measures in this regard.320  
Although accountable institutions, specifically the banks, adopt measures to identify 
beneficial owners in high-risk situations, most banks only go as far as establishing legal 
ownership.321 It bears noting that establishing and verifying the identity of beneficial owners 
remains a remarkable challenge to accountable institutions, one that requires enhanced 
guidance.322 What makes this even more challenging is the lack of information on beneficial 
owners.323 
 
The new enhanced recommendations require countries to create a system that provides 
information pertaining to beneficial owners. The Companies and Intellectual Property 
Registration Organisation Office (CIPRO) is the national company registry of South Africa.324 
Although CIPRO is accessible to all, the information is not verified and does not constitute 
adequate information on the beneficial owner of legal persons.325 However, the Trust 
Registry proves useful in identifying the beneficial owner of legal arrangements as the it 
keeps record of trusts, including the parties to the trust, but the accuracy of the information 
 
 
 
 
320 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 12. 
321 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 12. 
322 Parkman (2012: 33). 
323 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 12. 
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must be verified.326 Moreover, the difficulty in obtaining information on beneficial owners 
hinders the ability of accountable institutions to detect suspicious transactions, which in 
turn, hampers possible money laundering convictions.327 It is evident that South Africa 
needs to establish a sound system that provides information on the beneficial owner in an 
adequate, accurate and timely manner. 
 
3.6 Uncovered Financial Institutions 
 
There are currently 16 categories of accountable institutions listed in Schedule 1 of FICA. The 
accountable institutions comprise the financial and non-financial institutions that are placed 
under numerous obligations such as identifying customers, reporting information,      
keeping records and implementing the internal rules dealing with the latter obligations.328 
There are 34 255 accountable institutions registered with the Financial Intelligence Centre of 
South Africa.329 The number of registered accountable institutions increases annually.330 
However, 43 licensed service providers that offer investment advice fall outside the ambit of 
accountable institutions.331 Similarly, finance companies, moneylenders other than banks 
and lease companies, among others, are also ‘uncovered financial institutions’.332 
The financial institutions that fall outside the scope of accountable institutions create an 
undesirable ripple effect as these institutions are not required to implement CDD, keep 
 
 
326 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 17. See also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation 
Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 
2009 at 12 para 31. 
327 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 12. 
328 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 89 para 383. 
329 Financial Intelligence Centre Annual Report 2015/2016 at 12. 
330 Financial Intelligence Centre Annual Report 2015/2016 at 12. 
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records and comply with the requirements stipulated in FICA.333 This creates unfair 
competition between accountable financial institutions, which are burdened with the task 
of complying with FICA, and the financial institutions that are able to conduct their business 
without the limitations imposed by FICA.334 Although the amendment to Schedule 1 of FICA, 
through the inclusion of item 12,335 broadens the scope of financial service providers that 
 
fall under accountable institutions, many critics opine that the amendment fails to address 
the issue pertaining to uncovered financial institutions.336 
Despite the fact that uncovered financial institutions are required to comply with the 
reporting obligations under FICA, the issue created by the exclusion of these financial 
institutions from the other FICA requirements is not negated.337 Such exclusions are yet to 
be justified by way of demonstrating that they pose a low risk to money laundering.338 The 
 
exclusions create a gap in South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation and affect South 
Africa’s compliance with the FATF Recommendations negatively.339 
 
 
 
333 Portfolio Committee on Finance ‘Comments on the FIC Amendment Bill’, available at 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.banking.org.za/docs/default 
-source/market-conduct-division/comments-on-fic-amendment-bill-101215- 
(v4).pdf%3Fstatus%3DTemp%26sfvrsn%3D0.6690277485176921&ved=0ahUKEwiAqoKUv       - 
3QAhWIK8AKHVGuA2oQFggwMAM&usg=AFQjCNGRptgo0dDXQwoF6AesvcduT_W2Zg     (Accessed    on 
12 December 2016) at 13. 
334 Portfolio Committee on Finance ‘Comments on the FIC Amendment Bill’ at 13. 
335 The amendment to Schedule 1 of FICA introduced by Government Notice No 1104 of 2010 reads as 
follow: ‘A person who carries on the business of a financial services provider requiring authorisation in 
terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (Act 37 of 2002), to provide advice 
and intermediary services in respect of the investment of any financial product (but excluding a     
short term insurance contract or policy referred to in the Short term Insurance Act, 1998 (Act 53 of 
1998) and a health service benefit provided by a medical scheme as defined in section 1(1) of the 
Medical Schemes Act, 1998 (Act 131 of 1998)’. 
336 Portfolio Committee on Finance ‘Comments on the FIC Amendment Bill’ at 13. 
337 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 91 para 385. 
338 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 91 para 385. 
339 The ratings with regard to South Africa’s compliance with the FATF Recommendations are negatively 
affected by above mentioned exclusions, specifically Recommendation (2003) 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 21 
and 22. See also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 91 para 385. 
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In acknowledging the adverse effects that follow the exclusion of certain businesses and 
professions as accountable institutions, the Financial Intelligence Centre of South Africa has 
initiated a discussion on amendments to Schedule 1 of FICA.340 The Centre proposes to 
include those businesses and professions that fall outside the scope of accountable 
institutions, in order to advance South Africa’s countermeasures against money 
laundering.341 Advancement will follow where the latter proposal assumes an enforceable 
change to the current list of accountable institutions. 
 
3.7 Higher Risk Countries 
 
Recommendation 21342 stipulates that financial institutions afford special attention to their 
business relationships and transactions with both natural and legal persons from countries 
which fail to comply sufficiently with the FATF Recommendations. The background and 
purpose of these business relationships and transactions must be examined when their 
business or legal purpose is not apparent.343 The findings of the examination must be 
recorded in writing and be made accessible to competent authorities.344 In this situation, 
 
financial institutions must be able to implement countermeasures.345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340 Financial Intelligence Centre ‘Notice: Amendment of the Schedules to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001)’, available at https://www.fic.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx (Accessed on 28 
October 2016). 
341 Financial Intelligence Centre ‘Notice: Amendment of the Schedules to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001)’, available at https://www.fic.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx (Accessed on 28 
October 2016). 
342 Adopted as Recommendation 19 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
343 Recommendation 21 of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 7. 
344 Recommendation 21 of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 7. 
345 Recommendation 21 of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 7. 
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Accountable institutions are required to keep a record of the nature of their business 
relationships and transactions which they conclude with their clients.346 However, there is 
no express requirement for financial institutions to pay special attention to their business 
relationships and transactions that they conclude with persons from countries that do not 
comply with FATF Recommendations.347 Financial institutions must pay special attention, 
specifically where the business or legal purpose of the latter business or transaction is not 
apparent.348 It is worth noting that South Africa has put some mechanisms in place to 
enable financial institutions to take certain precautions when conducting business with 
countries that are not compliant with the FATF anti-money laundering standards.349 
However, these mechanisms are not enforceable.350 Section 29(1) of FICA requires 
accountable institutions to examine and submit a report to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
regarding any business relationship or transaction where there is no apparent business or 
legal purpose. This reporting obligation applies in respect of countries with no or insufficient 
compliance with the FATF Recommendations. Based on the general obligation created by 
s29(1) of FICA, one could argue that this provision complies with Recommendation 21. 
However, there is no express requirement to examine and prepare the findings in writing in 
order to make them available to the competent authorities.351 Moreover, there is a lack of 
specific provisions for financial institutions to apply countermeasures when they have a 
business relationship or when they conclude transactions with persons or entities from 
 
 
346 Sec 22(1)(e) of FICA. 
347 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 122 para 523-526. 
348 Recommendation 21 of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 7. 
349 For instance, Guidance Note 3 recommends that accountable institutions apply scrutiny to anti- 
money laundering systems in non-FATF countries. 
350 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 122 para 523-526. 
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countries that are not compliant with the anti-money laundering standards.352 For the 
reasons provided above, South Africa’s anti-money laundering controls remain non- 
compliant with Recommendation 21. 
 
3.8 Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
 
Recommendation 12 states that the customer due diligence and record-keeping 
requirements stipulated by Recommendations 5, 6 and 8 to 11 also apply to the designated 
non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP). 353 Moreover, FICA, together with 
Exemptions 2 and 3 to FICA and the anti-money laundering regulations that apply to 
financial institutions, also apply to DNFBPs.354 Thus, the shortcomings identified in the latter 
recommendations, laws and regulations apply to the DNFBPs as well.355 Attorneys, notaries, 
trust service providers, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, casinos, 
and public accountants constitute the DNFBPs in South Africa.356 
When the FATF conducted its last mutual evaluation of South Africa in 2008357 it found 
South Africa to be non-compliant with Recommendation 12 for the following reasons: 
Casinos are allowed to apply a reduced level of CDD when required to conduct CDD.358 
Exemption 14 discharges the onus on casinos to collect and verify the income tax 
 
 
352 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 7. See also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation 
Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 
2009 at 122 para 526. 
353 Adopted as Recommendation 22 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
354 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 159 para 712. 
355 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 217. 
356 Dealers in precious metals and stones are not listed as accountable institutions. See also Financial 
Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 11 para 25. 
357 Report on the mutual evaluation was only released in 2009. 
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registration number and residential address of its clients.359 Moreover, attorneys enjoy 
complete exemption from all CDD requirements and certain or all record keeping 
requirements when they render services that fall outside the purview of services listed in 
Exemption 10(1)(a).360 
Only accountants who provide investment advice or render investment broker services are 
deemed an accountable institution.361 The implication of this is that all accountants who 
render services other than the services listed in Schedule 1 of FICA, are not required to 
conduct CDD.362 Moreover, because dealers in precious metals and stones are not listed as 
an accountable institution, the only obligation such dealers incur is to report suspicious 
transactions.363 This results in the issues discussed section 3.6 above. Presently, South Africa 
has not made much progress in addressing its lack of compliance with Recommendation 12. 
 
3.9 Statistics 
 
Where a country lacks comprehensive statistics and data, it proves impossible to obtain an 
accurate picture of the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering control.364 When the FATF 
conducted South Africa’s mutual evaluation in 2008, it stated that the country’s lack of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
359 Exemption 14 of Exemptions in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 GNR.1596 of 20 
December 2002. 
360 International Bar Association Anti-Money Laundering Forum ‘Money Laundering’, available at 
http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/Money_Laundering.aspx (Accessed on 4 August 2016). See 
also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 162 para 724-725. 
361 Schedule 1, Item 12 of FICA. 
362 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 161 para 722. 
363 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
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statistics and data on money laundering made it difficult to conduct an adequate 
assessment of the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime in South Africa.365 
Recommendation 32366 requires countries to furnish competent authorities with 
comprehensive statistics and data on mechanisms concerning the effectiveness of its anti- 
money laundering control. Comprehensive statistics and data include statistics on suspicious 
transaction reports (STRs) received and disseminated; money laundering investigations; 
prosecutions and convictions; mutual legal assistance rendered and requested; and 
property that is frozen, seized and confiscated.367 
Although South Africa provides sufficient statistics on STRs received and disseminated, it 
fails to maintain detailed data on money laundering investigations, prosecutions,  
convictions and mutual legal assistance.368 South Africa compiles only basic data on the total 
number of money laundering investigations, prosecutions and convictions.369 To date, South 
 
Africa has not made any progress in its approach to collecting statistics and data concerning 
money laundering matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
365 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 36 para 107. 
366 Adopted as Recommendation 33 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
367 Recommendation 32 of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The Forty 
Recommendations 2003 at 13. 
368 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 22. See also Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation 
Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 
2009 at 40 para 13. 
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Table 1: South Africa’s statistics on its money laundering investigations 
and prosecutions for the years 2009-2013370 
Year ML Investigations ML Convictions 
2009 6 0 
2010 21 0 
2011 38 18 
2012 29 13 
2013 37 11 
 
 
Based on table 1, it is evident that the number of money laundering investigations and 
convictions have increased from 2009 to 2011. It is clear that South African authorities have 
improved in relation to money laundering investigations and convictions.371 However, there 
remains room for more enhanced countermeasures against money laundering.372 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
370 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 20. 
371 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 19. 
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2015 International Monetary Fund at 19. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
‘Attacking the profits of offences such as drug trafficking, money laundering and people 
smuggling is attacking both the motivation and ability to commit further serious crimes.’ 
- Chris Ellison 
 
This quotation emphasises the importance of an effective anti-money laundering regime. 
Thus, addressing the critical shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
legislation becomes imperative. As the National Treasury rightly stated during a 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee hearing373 “the reputational risk of noncompliance 
exceeds the cost of compliance”.374 This stresses the importance of remedying the 
 
deficiencies in South Africa’s money laundering control model. 
 
This study commenced by looking at the problem of money laundering, the implications 
thereof, and the importance of combating it. The origin of money and the various forms that 
money may assume in the context of money laundering were considered. The study then 
looked briefly at the history of money laundering and the response by both countries and 
the international community. The paper then proceeded to study the anti-money laundering 
regime of South Africa and its critical shortcomings. Recommendations in regard to these 
critical shortcomings will follow below. 
 
 
 
373 Portfolio Committee hearing dated 11 November 2015. 
374 Portfolio Committee on Finance ‘Comments on the FIC Amendment Bill’, available at 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.banking.org.za/docs/default 
-source/market-conduct-division/comments-on-fic-amendment-bill-101215- 
(v4).pdf%3Fstatus%3DTemp%26sfvrsn%3D0.6690277485176921&ved=0ahUKEwiAqoKUv       - 
3QAhWIK8AKHVGuA2oQFggwMAM&usg=AFQjCNGRptgo0dDXQwoF6AesvcduT_W2Zg     (Accessed    on 
12 December 2016). 
 
 
 
 
58  
4.1 Remedies for the critical shortcomings in South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
legislation 
With respect to PEPs, South African authorities need to place an express obligation on all 
accountable institutions to implement the necessary measures in order to identify PEPs and 
comply with Recommendation 6. South African authorities have acknowledged the 
shortcomings in relation to PEPs and have proposed amendments to FICA. However, the 
proposed amendments that address these shortcomings still have to be signed into law. 
With regard to correspondent banking, financial institutions need to be obligated to conduct 
enhanced due diligence on cross-border correspondent banking and similar relationships. 
Moreover, financial institutions must be prohibited from establishing or continuing 
correspondent banking relationships with shell banks. 
As the essential foundation of any country’s anti-money laundering framework,375 the risk- 
based approach must be free from any deficiencies. Therefore, it is imperative that South 
Africa compel its accountable institutions to apply the risk-based approach to money 
laundering. There is a pressing need for the President of South Africa to sign the FICA 
Amendment Bill 2015 into law as soon as possible. The enactment of the FICA Amendment 
Bill 2015 will render Clause 9 thereof enforceable and this will have the effect remedying 
the deficiency in relation to the risk-based approach. 
Another shortcoming that South Africa authorities need to address is the delay in instituting 
an official national risk assessment of the money laundering threats.376 A risk-based 
approach necessitates the conducting of a national risk assessment. When the South African 
 
375 Recommendation 1 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
376 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 6. 
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authorities conduct the national risk assessment, they will need ensure that it is done in a 
manner that is comprehensive and includes all accountable institutions and not only 
government agencies.377 Furthermore, the exclusion of certain businesses and professionals 
as accountable institutions affects the successful implementation of not only the risk-based 
approach procedures, but also of the overall quality of the countermeasures adopted 
against money laundering. By allowing certain businesses and professionals to fall outside 
the ambit of accountable institutions, negative consequences will continue to ensue, as 
explained in Chapter Three. It is for this reason that the discussion initiated by the Centre 
regarding the amendments to the Schedules of FICA, to make the list of accountable 
institutions more inclusive proves important.378 When this discussion progresses to 
enforceable amendments to FICA, it will resolve the issues concerning uncovered financial 
institutions and DNFBPs. By including more businesses and professionals under the 
accountable institutions umbrella, the South African authorities will enhance the fight 
against money laundering.379 
In respect of beneficial owners, accountable institutions must be required by law to 
establish and verify the identification of beneficial owners. South African authorities have 
already identified this shortcoming and addressed it in the FICA Amendment Bill 2015. 
Moreover, when it comes to higher risk countries, accountable institutions must be placed 
under a legal duty to pay special attention to their business relationships and transactions, 
and this obligation should extend to people from countries that are non-compliant or 
 
 
377 Monetary and Capital Markets Department ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: South Africa’ 
2015 International Monetary Fund at 6. 
378 Financial Intelligence Centre ‘Notice: Amendment of the Schedules to the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001)’, available at https://www.fic.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx (Accessed on 28 
October 2016). 
379 Interpretive Note to Recommendation 1 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations at 31. 
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insufficiently compliant with the FATF Recommendations. This is particularly important 
where there is no apparent business or logical legal purpose for the business relationship or 
transaction. 
In order to ensure that South Africa complies with Recommendation 12380 in its next round 
of mutual evaluation, the authorities must expand the ambit of FICA. The FATF provides for 
a more detailed set of recommendations that South African authorities can adopt in order 
to comply with Recommendation 12.381 This includes covering more accountants as 
accountable institutions, requiring attorneys to apply the money laundering 
countermeasures when rendering services beyond those described in FICA and listing 
dealers in precious stones and metals as accountable institutions.382 
Furthermore, given the important role statistics play in assessing the effectiveness of a 
country’s anti-money laundering regime, it is imperative that South Africa collect data and 
statistics in a comprehensive manner so as to provide  a detailed account of the money 
laundering investigations, prosecutions, convictions and the special money laundering 
investigate techniques used by competent authorities.383 
4.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has illustrated that even though South Africa is said to have an overall quality 
anti-money laundering legislative framework, it requires improvement. The more the South 
African authorities delay in remedying these critical shortcomings, the bigger the problem of 
 
 
 
380 Adopted as Recommendation 22 of the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. 
381 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism: South Africa’ 26 February 2009 at 165 para 747. 
382 Financial Action Task Force ‘Mutual Evaluation Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
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money laundering will become. Understandably, money laundering cannot be portrayed as 
one of the most serious crimes in South Africa that poses an imminent threat to the lives of 
its citizens. However, just because the money laundering crime does not victimise people 
directly, does not mean that we should be slow in our actions aimed at combating this 
problem in the most effective way. Money laundering poses an additional threat to the 
stability of South Africa’s already vulnerable economy. Given the adverse effects that 
accompany a lack of compliance with the FATF Recommendations and ineffective money 
laundering control framework, immediate action by South African authorities is warranted. 
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